MANAGING A POST-CIVIL WAR SYRIA
In Syria, years of civil battle that had exacerbated splits amongst ethnic and non secular teams lastly led to December 2024. Since then, Arab Gulf international locations, which as soon as opposed the Iranian-allied authorities of Bashar Assad, have been pivotal in supporting new Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharaa. They efficiently lobbied the US to drop sanctions.
Along with sharing mutual regional pursuits with Sharaa, the leaders of Gulf Arab states need a Syrian state that’s free from inner battle and might soak up the thousands and thousands of refugees that fled the battle to different international locations within the Center East.
Gulf states can assist postwar Syria diplomatically and financially. Nonetheless, they’ll’t want away the legacy of lengthy battle and sectarian strife. Israeli attacks on Syrian soil since Assad’s fall, in addition to current outbreaks of preventing within the Sweida area of southern Syria, underscore the continued fragility of the Syrian authorities and considerations over its means to comprise violence and migration outdoors of its borders.
THE CHALLENGE OF REGIONAL POLITICS
Syria illustrates a broader coverage problem for Gulf states. As their wealth, army power and affect have grown, these international locations have develop into dominant within the Arab world.
Because of this, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of {dollars} in efforts to affect governments and teams internationally. This contains the principally authoritarian governments within the Center East and North Africa, resembling Egypt’s.
However right here, Gulf states are torn politically. If democratic methods kind elsewhere within the Arab world, this might encourage Gulf residents to push for elected authorities at house. But overly coercive Arab governments outdoors of the Gulf will be susceptible to well-liked unrest and even civil battle.
Propping up unpopular regional governments dangers backfiring on Gulf Arab leaders in considered one of two methods.
First, it could entice Gulf states into protracted and damaging wars, resembling was the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failed army intervention in Yemen in opposition to the Houthis. Second, it could drive a wedge between Gulf states, as is seen with the current conflict in Sudan, through which the Saudis and Emiratis are backing rival factions.
